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Most people intuitively understand what it means to
“hear a tune in your head.” Converging evidence now
indicates that auditory cortical areas can be recruited
even in the absence of sound and that this corresponds to the phenomenological experience of imagining music. We discuss these findings as well as
some methodological challenges. We also consider
the role of core versus belt areas in musical imagery,
the relation between auditory and motor systems during imagery of music performance, and practical implications of this research.
Cognitive neuroscientists are faced with a seemingly
daunting task: understanding how the brain enables us
to experience our rich inner world of thoughts, feelings,
and images. The subjectivity involved in these internal
processes provides a particular challenge because scientific methods require one to measure verifiable, observable events. One domain in which this problem has
played out is mental imagery. Although behaviorists in
their heyday insisted that imagery was off limits because of its obscure, subjective nature, clever cognitivists demonstrated early on that reliable behavioral
measures could be obtained that served as indices of
what was going on inside the mind. Shepard’s classic
demonstration of mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler,
1971) serves as an excellent example of how an overt
measurement (response time to judge the orientation
of a letter) can provide evidence of a covert mental process. In other words, one infers the existence of a process based on observing some effect caused by that
process; in this respect, cognitive approaches are not
so different from physics or other sciences in which the
objects of study (neutrinos, black holes, or whatever)
are simply not accessible.
Recent Advances in the Study of Musical Imagery
Imagery is not exclusively visual, as anyone can attest
to who has ever been annoyed by some advertising jingle playing relentlessly in his or her mind. On a more
exalted level, composers such as Beethoven or Smetana, who became deaf later in their lives, nonetheless
were able to compose magnificent music, presumably
because they were able to conjure up musical images
solely internally. Many researchers have concentrated
on understanding musical imagery in particular partly
because of the ubiquity and vividness of imagined music. So what enables us to produce these “mental con*Correspondence: robert.zatorre@mcgill.ca
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certs”? What are the psychological and neural mechanisms associated with these processes?
A handful of studies have now been carried out on
this topic using a variety of techniques, including, magneto-encephalography (Schürmann et al., 2002), positron emission tomography (Halpern and Zatorre, 1999;
Zatorre et al., 1996), and functional MRI (Halpern et al.,
2004; Kraemer et al., 2005; Yoo et al., 2001), as well
as behavioral lesion measures (Zatorre and Halpern,
1993), which provide better evidence of causality than
do functional measures. These diverse studies converge on one principal finding: that neural activity in
auditory cortex can occur in the absence of sound (Figure 1) and that this activity likely mediates the phenomenological experience of imagining music. Beyond
this basic understanding, however, much remains to be
understood, including the relative contributions of primary versus secondary auditory regions in each hemisphere, the participation of the frontal cortex to the imagery process, and the role of musical training in
development of musical imagery. Before discussing
these substantive questions, however, we turn our attention briefly to methodological issues.
Methodological Problems and Solutions
The problem of measuring internal phenomena might
appear to have finally found a solution with functional
imaging techniques, since one can observe the underlying neural activity more directly, rather than inferring its presence. Yet, we are still left with the conceptual problem of knowing what is being measured. Thus,
merely placing subjects in a scanner and asking them
to imagine some music, for instance, simply will not
do, because one will have no evidence that the desired
mental activity was actually taking place. Neural activity can still be measured under these circumstances,
but it may well be related to other processes than the
one intended. One good solution to this problem involves behavioral indices, such that an overt response
is measured that either depends on or correlates with
the imagined event. For instance, if we ask people to
imagine the first four notes of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony and they correctly and consistently judge that
the fourth note is lower than the third, then we have
objective evidence that an internal representation containing pitch information has been accessed (Halpern,
1988). In the context of neuroimaging, such tasks have
the disadvantage that they carry a lot of cognitive overhead in the form of attentional, working memory, and
response demands; but these can be accounted for
with appropriate control conditions. Simpler tasks, such
as imagining the continuation of a known musical selection (Kraemer et al., 2005) can also be useful. But in
such tasks there is less control over the success with
which imagery may be achieved at any given moment,
absent a behavioral correlate, such as the time taken
for the continuation, matched against the length of the
excerpt. Using fMRI poses special problems because
of the loud acoustical artifact produced by echo-planar
imaging, which itself results in a large auditory cortical
response. The interactions between this response and
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Figure 1. Lateral View of Right Cerebral Hemisphere Illustrating
Area of Hemodynamic Increase, in Color, during an Auditory Imagery Task
Although the task is performed in silence, activation is observed
within auditory cortex in the posterior aspect of the superior temporal gyrus. Data reanalyzed from Halpern et al., 2004.

the one related to the formation of auditory imagery
makes interpretation difficult, particularly when the
hemodynamic response functions between imagined
and perceived events overlap (Kraemer et al., 2005).
This problem can be mitigated, however, by using
sparse sampling or other noise abatement strategies.
What Role Does Auditory Cortex Play in Imagery?
Despite these technical difficulties, most imagery studies have indeed succeeded in demonstrating that the
auditory cortex responds even in the absence of sound
and that this response tends to co-occur with subjective reports of imagining music. But does the primary, or core auditory cortex, participate in musical imagery? A similar question exists in the field of visual
imagery, but there is now substantial evidence that primary visual cortex can be recruited by certain tasks
(Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003). The literature in musical imagery to date is still uncertain on this point. Most
prior studies do agree that activation in secondary, or
belt, auditory cortex is reliably found (Figure 1). Although some authors have reported activation in primary cortex, the precise location of core areas can be
difficult to determine because of the intersubject variability of these structures; furthermore, because of partial volume effects, what may appear to be activity in
primary regions may actually represent spillover from
adjacent nonprimary zones. The most critical variable,
however, is likely to be the task demands, as they have
proven to be in the visual domain. It is premature to
anticipate what auditory imagery tasks might reliably
elicit primary activation, given the very small number of
studies carried out so far and the small subset of those
that have even sought to verify the precise location of
the activation.
An additional point that many of these studies address concerns the lateralization of the response; once
again, task demands and also the nature of the stimuli
to be imagined likely play a role. For instance, bilateral
activation has been observed when familiar songs with
lyrics are used, most likely because there is imagery of

both the sung text and the musical component (Zatorre
et al., 1996). But when instrumental music is used
(Halpern et al., 2004), the pattern tends to shift toward
activation in the right auditory cortex, in accord with the
important role of these structures in processing pitch
information (Zatorre et al., 2002). The recent study by
Kraemer et al. (2005) did show left auditory cortex activation even with nonverbal materials, but the degree of
activity on the right, if any, was not reported, leaving
this question still open.
Assuming we can agree that auditory cortical activity
underlies the experience of imagery, the question still
remains, how does the auditory cortex become active
in the first place? The most likely explanation is that
top-down mechanisms are involved in reactivating neural traces that are somehow encoded in sensory cortex.
Long ago, Penfield observed that electrical stimulation
of the exposed surface of sensory cortical areas (Figure
2) could result in the patient reporting illusory visual or
auditory percepts (Penfield and Perot, 1963). The artificial electrical input from an electrode results in a hallucinatory rather than an imagery experience, but presumably under normal circumstances there is a signal
coming from elsewhere that accesses the sensory information in auditory cortex. It is most likely that interactions between frontal cortical areas and auditory
cortex are the way that imagery is instantiated. There
is a tight anatomical connectivity between these regions, and most studies that report whole-brain data
involving the generation of an auditory image find frontal cortex to be an important component (Halpern and
Zatorre, 1999). Thus, when one wants to conjure up a
song in one’s mind, frontal-based retrieval mechanisms
might be called upon; at the same time, feedback signals from auditory cortex could be important in distinguishing between imagery and a real sound coming
from the environment. Indeed, Griffiths (2000) proposed
that a breakdown in this system might be responsible
for the musical hallucinations that he observed in people with acquired deafness. It is notable that this study
found no evidence for primary auditory cortex activation, making suspect any argument linking primary cortex activation with stronger phenomenology of imagined sounds.
Auditory versus Motor Imagery
Motor imagery is the imagination of the kinesthetics involved in actual movement and has been examined for
both simple tapping sequences and complex musical
routines. One methodological challenge in examining
brain activations in motor imagery is to insure that no
actual movements have occurred, which can be accomplished via EMG monitoring. Motor imagery for
nonauditory-associated movements sometimes results
in activation of M1 and often activates secondary motor
areas, such as SMA (Naito et al., 2002). Thus it should
not be surprising that musicians can evoke motor imagery for their instrument during imagined playing. For instance, Langheim et al. (2002) asked string players to
play or imagine playing a familiar piece; the times taken
to play and imagine the pieces were highly correlated.
These authors found a number of areas to be active in
frontal lobes, cerebellum, parietal lobe, and SMA, but
not M1 during imagined playing compared to rest.
In many musical situations, sound is associated with
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Figure 2. Regions of the Exposed Cortical
Surface, Marked with Dots, which Resulted
in a Hallucinatory Experience of Hearing Music Upon Electrical Stimulation
Modified from Penfield and Perot, 1963.

movement. Instrumentalists make extensive arm, finger, and sometimes foot movements in the course of
producing their instrument’s voice. Singers use complex movements of the vocal apparatus to produce
songs, especially if they are putting words to those
songs. Given the behavioral and neural evidence for
people being able to imagine musical movements, is
there evidence that auditory and motor imagery may be
integrated in the brain? Hickok et al. (2003) found that
area Spt (parietal-temporal boundary) responded to
both imagined auditory (both speech and music) and
covertly produced sequences in a similar fashion. In
perhaps a stronger test of this integration, Haueisen
and Knösche (2001) found that pianists showed activation in primary motor regions corresponding to the finger that would have produced a given note, even when
they were merely listening to pieces they knew how to
perform. Conversely, Haslinger et al. (2005) observed
activation in several auditory areas when musicians
watched a silent video of someone fingering piano
keys. Thus, despite a rather different circuitry, imagery
of related musical sounds and movement can be integrated. This corresponds to reports from musicians
that they can “hear” their instrument during mental
practice.
Cross-Modal Interactions
Processing in one sensory modality can affect processing in another, either by increasing or suppressing activity; similar interactions also appear to occur if one or
both tasks are based not on perceptual, but on imagined information. Langheim et al. (2002) found that
imagining musical performances suppressed activity in
the auditory regions, although they suggested that it
may have been related to suppression of scanner
noise. Halpern et al. (2004) also found that a visual imagery task suppressed activity in right secondary auditory cortex (which was active in imagery for musical
timbre) to levels below that seen with a silent baseline.
As noise was not a factor given the sparse sampling
technique used, it seems that cross-modal interactions
may operate similarly in auditory imagery as they do in
the processing of actual sound.
Implications
Musical imagery is important to musicians, so an understanding of its neural basis may help us understand
aspects of expertise as well as provide some useful
information for music educators. For instance, brass,
wind, string players, and singers imagine the pitch of
an upcoming entrance to facilitate tuning. Conductors
and arrangers who study scores in silence also must
imagine pitches, as well as timbre, rhythm, and other

musical attributes. Highben and Palmer (2004) asked
pianists to learn an unfamiliar piece, under normal conditions or when they could not hear their own playing.
Players who tested high on an aural skills battery were
least disturbed in learning the piece without auditory
feedback, suggesting that their auditory imagery skills
were adding in the necessary auditory experience
to facilitate learning. Humphreys (1986) reported that
training in auditory imagery improved harmony skills
in children.
The research described above can also help illuminate how musicians use mental practice. This skill involves imagery in several modalities: visual (pianists
“see” their hands on the keyboard), motor/kinesthetic
(they “feel” the keyboard and finger motions), as well as
auditory. Experimental evidence bearing on the neural
processes involved is still quite limited, but PascualLeone (2003) has demonstrated that mental practice
improves performance, albeit not to the level of real
practice. However, changes over time in the size of the
cortical representation of the motor cortex were similar
for real and imagined practice. Given the existence of
cross-modal interactions, we may eventually be in a
better position to explain when and how these imagined experiences will actually benefit musicians and
thus be able to optimize practice regimes for individuals as well as add to the literature on neuroplasticity
in response to expert training.
We have attempted here to argue that well-considered behavioral methods combined with convergent
neuroimaging and other techniques can successfully
externalize the particularly covert process of musical
auditory imagery. This research allows us to gain insight
into one of the more inaccessible aspects of cognition,
and thereby provides us with valuable information concerning the neural underpinnings of abstract mental
processes. Clinical or educational applications pertaining to these highest levels of cognitive function will
emerge only to the extent that we can rigorously link
brain mechanisms to mental processes; we would argue that the future of cognitive neuroscience will depend on expanding just this sort of knowledge.
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